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What is Democratic Education?*
David R. Hiley
Department of Philosophy
Why does education matter in a democratic society and in particular, why does higher education matter? What should a demo-
cratic education be like, and who should decide how 
future citizens will be educated? 
These questions suggest that education is a political 
matter as much as it is about teaching and curriculum. 
Plato understood this when he placed education at the 
center of his construction of the ideal Republic. Thomas 
Jefferson also understood this from the earliest days of 
the democratic revolution in America.
In 1779, Jefferson submitted a bill to the Virginia 
legislature that, had it passed, would have provided a 
system of education from primary school through uni-
versity at public expense. His “Bill for the More General 
Diffusion of Knowledge” included a selection system 
through which young men (yes, only young men) of  
ability could rise through the system to university  
education regardless of family background and means.1 
He offered three interconnected rationales. First, igno-
rance enslaved the mind, and only education could  
liberate people from the powers of tyrants and the  
superstitions of priests. Second, publicly supported 
education would break down the artificial, inherited 
aristocracy that was characteristic of Europe and would 
replace it with an egalitarian society. Finally, Jefferson 
also well knew the inherent risks when the people rule. 
The rule of the people can so easily degenerate into the 
tyranny of the many. It has been said that in a democ-
racy, one depends on the wisdom of strangers. It is, 
therefore, in our mutual interest to support the educa-
tion, including higher education, of citizens in a democ-
racy, since our fate depends on them. This was a new 
and radical idea, because it rested on a new and radical 
conception of citizenship. 
How should we educate citizens for democracy? How 
we answer this question depends, in part, on what we 
think about democracy. Too often we identify democ-
racy with such institutions as voting, representative 
government, the rule of law, constitutional protections 
of individual rights, and so forth. As important as these 
are, democracy is more than this. John Dewey observed 
that “a democracy is more than a form of government; 
it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint 
communicated experience” in which we understand our 
own actions and interests in relation to shared concerns 
of other citizens.2 At its core, a democratic form of life is 
grounded in respect for individuals and our recognition 
of an obligation to come together with other individuals 
to make decisions about our common good.
This is more difficult than it sounds in a pluralist  
society such as ours. We often bring very different  
backgrounds and moral and religious perspectives to 
many of the issues that we must decide as a people. 
Think, for example, of the war in Iraq, of abortion 
policy, or of support for embryonic stem cell research. 
Our disagreement about the best policy is often based 
on fundamental differences in basic moral and political 
values—on different views about America’s role in the 
world, for example, or the right to life vs. right to choice, 
or when life begins. In a pluralist democracy, can any-
one legitimately claim to be in possession of the truth 
of the matter and declare that opposing views are false? 
Plato wanted a philosopher king—someone who had  
ultimate wisdom—to rule. But in a democracy, the  
people rule (which is why Plato disliked democracy). 
And in a pluralistic democracy, the people often dis-
agree about fundamental values, yet we still must make 
decisions that bind us all. 
Political philosopher Benjamin Barber once observed 
that “democracy begins where certainty ends.” 3 For 
him, the political world is necessarily uncertain; a world 
in which reasonable people can come to very different 
conclusions, a world in which we must recognize that 
other citizens have different values and also recognize 
the fallibility of our own best judgments. How should 
citizens and future citizens be educated for the chal-
lenges of a pluralistic democracy?
*This essay is adapted from chapter 6 of my book, Doubt and the Demands of Democratic Citizenship, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
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To frame this question, let me note a paradox about 
the condition of democracy in the late 20th and  
early 21st century. When Amartya Sen, the Nobel 
Prizing-winning economist was asked what he thought 
the most important development of the 20th century 
was, he responded, “the emergence of democracy as 
the preeminently acceptable form of governance.” 4 His 
view is widely shared. Yet many students of American 
culture believe that the idea of democracy at home is 
deeply strained. In her book, Democracy on Trial, for 
example, Jean Elshtain argues that democracy is in a 
particularly perilous condition in our country. Elshtain 
chronicles the ways in which we find ourselves being 
pulled between an increasingly fragmented society 
along the lines of race, ethnicity, and gender, on the one 
hand, and the desire to see ourselves a one people, on 
the other.
Elshtain begins her account of democracy’s perils 
with the ironic observation of John Courtney Murray 
that “disagreement is a very difficult thing to reach.” 5 
She believes that it is the task of a democratic citizen in 
a pluralist society to be able to reach disagreement, and 
she uses the task of reaching disagreement as a lever 
for diagnosing the fragile condition of democracy. She 
believes we need a new social covenant in America. A 
“new social covenant,” she writes, “is not a dream of 
unanimity or harmony, but the name given to the hope 
that we can draw on what we hold in common even as 
we disagree.” 6
This, it seems to me, is the best formulation of the 
challenge we face in thinking about education suited for 
a pluralistic democracy. How are we to educate citizens 
and foster institutions that allow us to differ in ways ap-
propriate to a pluralistic society, yet find the common 
ground necessary for social commitments and collective 
responsibilities? Sen’s optimism about the spread of de-
mocracy and Elshtain’s distress about its fragility in our 
pluralistic culture provide a powerful framework for 
situating the cultural context of thinking about demo-
cratic education. This paradox offers the possibility to 
foster an understanding of the hopes and risks of plu-
ralistic democracy and, at a minimum, to give occasions 
such as this dialogue series to reflect on the connection 
between democracy and education.
The requirements of a pluralistic society have moti-
vated a good deal of recent rethinking of the curricu-
lum, most obvious in our attempts to deal directly with 
issues of race, ethnicity, and gender in the curriculum, 
and in requiring that students be introduced to non-
Western cultural perspectives. These are central to the 
general education requirements for students at UNH 
and most universities. But there are other, less obvious 
areas of the curriculum that also need to be rethought 
from the needs of democratic society. Think for a mo-
ment about why we require science of all students. Why 
do we believe that it is important for students to study 
biology, for example? Not why biology students or pre-
med students should study biology, but why all students 
study biology? That it is intrinsically important—true as 
that might be—is not a sufficiently compelling answer. 
There are lots of things that are intrinsically interesting 
and important that we do not require of all students. 
That knowledge of biology is important in a society 
faced with significant policy decisions concerning  
the environment, for example, or stem cell research is 
compelling. Knowledge of biology or chemistry or an 
understanding of technology and its social implications 
is critical for informed citizenship. It is important for 
democratic participation in policy decisions that are 
consequential to us as members of society. If we believe 
that informed citizenship is the reason that knowledge 
of the sciences is important for all students, that is, if 
scientific literacy is critical for the deliberative processes 
of a democratic society, then this is the objective that 
should guide the science we require of all students. The 
democratic purposes of scientific understanding must 
influence how the sciences are taught as part of the gen-
eral education of all students. 
Another less obvious but equally important demo-
cratic purpose of the education we expect for all stu-
dents has to do with communication. Everyone believes 
that a fundamental goal of the education of all students 
is effective communication. Some of the most impres-
sive recent work on curriculum and on teaching has 
focused on the connection between writing and learn-
ing. But writing, and communication generally, should 
not be thought of as merely modes of individual self-ex-
pression. Communication, of course, is fundamentally 
dialogical—we are seeking to be understood by others. 
But what might this mean in the context of democratic 
education? What might teaching look like if it fostered 
the dialogical aspects of communication in a pluralist 
society?
In his essay, “The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation 
of Mankind,” Michael Oakeshott writes that “education, 
properly speaking, is an initiation into the skill and 
partnership of…conversation, to recognize the voices, 
to distinguish the proper occasions of utterance, and 
in which we acquire the intellectual and moral habits 
appropriate to conversation.” 7 “Conversation” is a term 
of art for Oakeshott. Its contrast concept for Oakeshott 
is “inquiry.” The goal of inquiry is agreement about the 
We Hold These Truths
truth of the matter, and while this is the appropriate 
mode for many aspects of our life, it is unsuited to some 
of our most fundamental disagreements. Conversation, 
by contrast, is a partnership where the goal is less a 
matter of agreement than of understanding those who 
might differ. In a pluralistic society, we must recognize 
that there will sometimes be reasoned disagreement 
about some things—that sincere, intelligent, morally 
sensitive people can think from or arrive at different 
and incompatible values. In a pluralistic democracy, 
thoughtful disagreement should be expected and  
respected. 
But still, in a democracy citizens must decide our  
collective good even when we disagree. This is why 
Elshtain thinks a pluralistic democracy requires a new 
social covenant through which we can reach disagree-
ment about some things yet still seek democratic agree-
ment where we must.
Reaching disagreement is a skill that is in exceedingly 
short supply. What we increasingly lack as a society is 
the capacity for a conversation of diverse voices. This is 
what I believe Elshtain means by a new social covenant. 
It is what Amy Gutmann, a political philosopher and 
president of the University of Pennsylvania, describes 
as the very nature of democratic education. According 
to Gutmann “the most distinctive feature of a demo-
cratic theory of education is that it makes a democratic 
virtue out of our inevitable disagreement…?” That is, 
democratic education is not about getting to the truth. 
It is about the processes that cultivate the democratic 
dispositions of citizens and the institutions that foster 
those dispositions in the face of persistent differences. 
As Alan Keenan has put it, it requires “affirming rather 
than denying democracy’s constitutive incompleteness, 
such a mode of democracy would require attitudes of 
forbearance, self-limitation, and openness to collective 
self-questioning.” 8
Here are some of my thoughts about ingredients of a 
democratic disposition. First—and less obvious than it 
may appear—it needs to be a disposition for democracy, 
for its aspirations, their incomplete realization, and its 
fragile nature. Second, it needs to include the capacity 
for democratic communication. Mutuality and respect 
for those who disagree are the conditions for the possi-
bility of democratic communication. This is much more 
than expressing and respecting diversity. It is the will-
ingness to understand those who differ while seeking 
common ground, given the persistence of differences. 
Third, it needs to include the capacity to hold strong 
convictions while recognizing one’s own fallibility and, 
thus, the fallibility of one’s convictions. The ideologues 
have framed too many of our important debates as if 
our alternatives were true believers or the misguided, 
between “red-staters” or “blue-staters,” patriots or  
traitors, and so forth. What this divisive political land-
scape has produced is a great many people who have 
become cynical about politics, alienated from govern-
mental institutions, and indifferent about the outcome 
of our crucial disagreements. It seems to me that the 
democratic disposition must find its place between the 
true believers and the cynics, since cynical indifference 
is as much the enemy of democracy as intolerance. 
Finally, a democratic disposition needs to be skep-
tical—not its cynical version, the version fostered by 
world-weary editorialists and investigative reporters, 
nor an indifferent skepticism which doubts equally ev-
ery opinion. I mean the kind of skepticism exemplified 
by Socrates who could conceive of himself both as son 
of Athens, its true citizen, and yet its sharpest critic. 
We need to commit ourselves to the democratic values 
at the core of American society while being willing to 
doubt and criticize presidents and congresses and non-
governmental institutions when they put those values 
at risk. The historian, Daniel Boorstin, observed that 
“the courage to doubt, on which American pluralism, 
federalism, and religious liberty are founded, is a special 
brand of courage, a more selfless brand of courage than 
the courage of orthodoxy: a brand that has been rarer 
and more precious in the history of the West then  
courage of the crusader.” 9 Democratic education should 
foster the courage to doubt.
What do you think about my suggestions and how 
would you subtract or add to this list? Entering into a 
conversation about what democracy is, about the rela-
tionship between education and democracy, and about 
how we might educate citizens for a pluralist and demo-
cratic society is itself an aspect of democratic education, 
since it recognizes that ultimately WE should decide 
the answers to these questions. And the answers we 
decide should be subject to the ongoing questioning by 
future citizens. This conversation itself might serve to 
invigorate your education and also to reinvigorate our 
democracy.
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